Asymmetric tariff reduction within the SADC protocol on trade its implications for industrial development within member states: A theoretical perspective by Tsitsi Effie, Mutambara
 1
ASYMMETRIC TARIFF REDUCTION WITHIN THE SADC 
PROTOCOL ON TRADE AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR 




Mutambara, Tsitsi Effie 
Rhodes University 
Department of Economics and Economic History 
P.O. Box 94 Grahamstown 6140 
Republic of South Africa 
Tel: 046 603 8905/ 8301 








The Southern African Development Community (SADC) aims to facilitate 
and attain deeper economic integration and industrial development among its 
members. To achieve these objectives, the grouping developed the SADC 
Protocol on Trade whose implementation began in 2000. While the SADC 
Protocol on Trade focusses primarily on trade integration, thus mainly a trade 
instrument, this paper seeks to explore how it could be used to facilitate 
industrial development instead of using it sorely for trade integration. In 
analysing this Protocol it has been observed that it has specific provisions that 
address issues on industrial development within the grouping. These 
provisions are Part Two Article 3, Part Four Article 21 Paragraph 1, and Part 
Five Article 22. The asymmetric tariff reduction schedule governing the 
implementation of this Protocol enables liberalisation of product categories at 
different paces taking into account the different levels of industrial 
development between members. As the region progresses in implementing the 
Protocol, the aforementioned Articles could be utilised to facilitate industrial 
development. Theoretical debates upon which these Articles could be used to 
facilitate industrial development rest on the infant industry argument, the 
static and dynamic effects of economic integration. Limitations of the 
theoretical frameworks will be explored and how this could impact on 
industrial development initiatives by the grouping.  
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The Southern African Development Community (SADC) Protocol on Trade 
which was signed in 1996 and came into force in September 2000, seeks to 
further liberalise intra-SADC trade and thus bring into effect the SADC Free 
Trade Area (SADC FTA). Part Two Article 3 of the Protocol indicates a 
phased down elimination of tariffs and non-tariff barriers and that within eight 
years from entry into force of the Protocol, elimination of barriers to trade is 
expected to have been achieved. By 2008, at least 85 percent of all intra-
SADC trade should be free, thus, ushering in the SADC Free Trade Area. Full 
liberalisation by all countries is expected to be completed by 2012. Currently, 
SADC countries are at various levels of trade liberalisation through effecting 
their tariff reduction schedules and special agreements for some sectors. 
 
While the SADC Protocol on Trade is mainly a trade instrument, it has 
specific provisions that address issues on industrial development within the 
regional grouping. These provisions are Part Two Article 3 and Part Four 
Article 21. The asymmetric tariff reduction schedule which governs the 
implementation of the SADC Protocol on Trade takes into account the 
different levels of industrial development between member states and thus, 
enables the liberalisation of the product categories at different paces. 
 
This paper thus focusses on the aforementioned provisions in the SADC 
Protocol on Trade and their possible implications for industrial development. 
The provisions within the asymmetric tariff reduction schedule are based on 
the infant industry argument for protective trade policies so as to nurture 
industries until they can cope with competition. A discussion based on this 
argument will thus form part of the implications for industrial development. 
The static and dynamic effects of economic integration and new economic 
geography as it relates to industrial location will also be used in discussing 
possible implications for industrial development. 
 
Section 2 discusses asymmetric tariff reduction, showing the different product 
categories and their corresponding tariff reduction schedules. It also shows the 
different categories in which countries were put and their corresponding trade 
liberalisation schedules. Section 3 examines the theoretical perspectives of 
static and dynamic effects of economic integration and the infant industry 
argument on industrial development and implications for the SADC region. 
Section 4 examines possible limitations for industrial development within the 
regional grouping, while Section 5 concludes the paper.  
 
 
2. Asymmetric Tariff Reduction  
 
SADC member states are at different levels of industrial development and the 
implementation of the SADC FTA would most likely lead to unequal 
industrial costs and benefits. Provisions were thus made within the SADC 
Protocol on Trade to minimise the resulting conflicts that could occur; thus 
 3
helping to achieve balanced industrial development. This was done, in part, 
through Part Two Article 3 of the SADC Protocol on Trade.  
 
2.1 Asymmetric tariff reduction at regional level 
 
In line with Part Two Article 3 of the SADC Protocol on Trade, tariff 
reduction is not across the board. A phased elimination of tariffs was 
determined and agreed upon by the Committee of Ministers of Trade (CMT). 
As such, products were divided into categories, each with different tariff 
reduction deadlines, thus, giving rise to an asymmetric tariff reduction 
schedule.  
 
As Table A-1 (Appendix 1) shows, Category A products are for immediate 
liberalisation with tariffs reduced to zero immediately upon entry into force of 
the SADC Trade Protocol. Category B products are to be liberalised gradually 
starting immediately upon entry into force of the Protocol. Category C 
products are regarded as sensitive goods and as such are not to be liberalised 
immediately. Their liberalisation may start within the agreed phase out period, 
i.e. five years after entry into force of the Protocol, but can continue beyond 
the eight years. Category E products can be exempted from preferential 
treatment under Part Two Articles 9 and 10 of the Protocol and these products 
comprise a very small fraction of intra-SADC trade.  
 
Table A-2 (Appendix 2) shows the implementation of the SADC Protocol on 
Trade through asymmetric tariff reduction at regional level. The relatively 
well-developed SACU group is to front load its tariff phase down programme 
starting as soon as the trade agreement comes into force. The developing 
countries, viz. Mauritius and Zimbabwe, will mid-load their tariff phase down 
programme, implementing a programme that starts in the middle of the eight-
year process. The rest of SADC, categorised as least developed, will begin 
their phase down schedule in the 5th or 6th year of implementation, which is 
towards the end of the process. This asymmetric tariff reduction only applies 
to goods in Categories B and C, while those in Category A are for immediate 
liberalisation (Mutambara, 2001, p.21; SADC, 2002, p.22; Nhara, 2003, p. 
21). 
 
Therefore, once implementation begins, countries are allowed different levels 
of tariff reduction coverage, e.g. 97 percent for SACU while 60 – 80 percent 
for the least developed countries, as shown in Table A-2 (Appendix 2). 
Therefore, while it is expected that by 2008 a free trade area would have been 
achieved, with 85 percent of intra-SADC trade at zero tariffs, provision is 
given for extending the full implementation of the SADC FTA to 2012.  
 
2.2 Implications of asymmetric tariff reduction for industrial 
development 
 
Lengthening the phasing-in periods during the implementation of the SADC 
Protocol on Trade (as shown in Table A-2, Appendix 2) gives countries time 
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to develop and consolidate their industries more before full liberalisation. This 
opportunity is given to all member states although the durations differ between 
countries depending on their levels of development. The subsequent four years 
after 2008 in which a few sensitive products may still call for duty, would be 
beneficial to countries as that gives more time for the very sensitive domestic 
industries to adjust and become more focussed, in anticipation of the stiff 
competition that results with the full implementation of the SADC FTA. It is 
therefore important for countries to utilise the provisions in Part Two Article 4 
Paragraph 2 of the SADC Protocol on Trade and use the time available before 
2012 to propose and implement sound industrial policies that seek to develop 
further and improve the competitiveness of those industries whose products 
have been put in the sensitive products list and deemed sensitive to immediate 
tariff reduction.  
 
 
3. A Theoretical Perspective of Industrial Development through 
Economic Integration and Implications for SADC  
 
This section examines how the static effects of trade creation and trade 
diversion, the dynamic effects of economic integration, and the infant industry 
argument could be used to present an argument for industrial development.  
 
3.1 Industrial development through static effects of economic integration  
 
Static effects occur because economic integration shifts the pattern of trade 
between member states and non-members. The static effects are called trade 
creation and trade diversion and Jacob Viner (1950) coined these terms as 
such. Both effects have the potential to develop domestic industries, and 
ultimately the regional industrial base. 
 
Trade creation effects take place whenever economic integration leads to the 
replacement of relatively high-cost domestic production with lower-cost 
imports from a partner country. This production shift represents a movement 
in the direction of the free-trade allocation of resources and is therefore 
presumed beneficial for welfare (Appleyard et al., 2006; Davies et al., 1993; 
Corden, 1972, p. 467). 
 
Displaced previous home production and greater domestic consumption at the 
new lower price would lead to an increase in imports now coming exclusively 
from the lower-cost partner countries. These are the production effect (gain 
from specialisation) and the consumption effect (gain from exchange) as noted 
by Corden (1972, p. 467-471) and Jaber (1970, p. 254), that lead to trade 
expansion. In the context of SADC, this trade expansion would motivate each 
lower-cost producing SADC member state to expand domestic production of 
its specific product category item so as to meet the increasing imports from 
higher-cost producing SADC member states. This has implications for 
increased industrial capacity utilisation and industrial expansion in the lower-
cost producing SADC members in the specific liberalised Category A, B and 
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C products, as they seek to meet the regional market for the specific products 
they have competitive advantage in as the region’s lower-cost producers. This 
movement in the direction of comparative advantage could thus become a 
basis for industrial development in the various SADC countries. 
 
Conditions for a more trade creating economic integration arrangement have 
been proposed by a number of authors1. These conditions include a large 
economic area by having more members in the regional grouping, lower tariff 
after the union, competitive members by having a wider range of overlapping 
products produced by the industries in the member countries as well as greater 
cost differences in unit costs for a specific overlap, more elastic supply and 
demand curves, as well as more trade among members. Each of these 
conditions has implications for industrial development within the regional 
grouping.  
 
For example, a larger economic area coupled with increased trade between 
members presents greater scope and motivation for increased industrial 
expansion as increased membership implies increased demand for the 
product(s) in which the lower-cost member country has comparative 
advantage. The more competitive members are, the greater the possibilities for 
substituting products of one member for those of the other. This presents 
stronger motivation for the most efficient producer in whatever product to be 
more effective in rationalising its production so as to capture the wider 
regional market, thus a motivation to improve industrial base and capacity 
utilisation. The more elastic supply and demand curves are, the more 
responsive factors of production will be in moving more easily from the high-
cost sectors (which are suppose to be contracting) to the low-cost sectors 
(which are suppose to be expanding). Thus, the gains from specialisation are 
increased motivating industrial expansion. 
 
Corden’s (1972) economies of scale analysis can be presented as motivation 
for industrial expansion by the least-cost producers in the various product 
categories in the regional grouping. The least-cost producing member state in 
a product enjoys a cost-reduction gain as a result of trade creation because it 
now obtains its domestic supplies at a lower cost of production. However, this 
cost-reduction effect is not an orthodox trade creation effect because it is not a 
result of a movement to a cheaper source of supply in another country, but 
rather, the cheapening of an existing source of supply. The cost-reduction 
effect accrues to consumers in the least-cost producing partner country 
through a production effect and a consumption effect (Corden, 1972, p. 467-8; 
Robson, 1987, p. 38). These two effects have implications for increased 
domestic industrial expansion in SADC countries through lower costs of 
production as well as increased domestic demand by consumers.  
 
                                                 
1 e.g. Maasdorp (1982), Winters (1991), Carim (1997), Davies at al. (1993), Haarlov (1997), 
Andic et al. (1971), Leisner (1963) Davies (1994), Jaber (1970), and Appleyard et al. (2006). 
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Trade diversion takes place whenever economic integration leads to the 
replacement of cheaper initial imports from the rest of the world with 
relatively more expensive imports from a partner country. This shift represents 
a movement away from the free-trade allocation of resources and it is argued 
that it could reduce welfare (Appleyard et al., 2006; Corden, 1972, p. 468; 
Davies, 1994, p. 12; Davies et al., 1993). 
 
Even though the rest of the world is still the low-cost producer/supplier in 
terms of real resource costs, it ceases to be competitive in the markets of the 
various member states because of their preferential treatment of each other due 
to the free trade arrangement. With regard to SADC, while the shift from the 
low-cost producer who is a non-member, to the higher-cost less efficient 
SADC member (i.e. the new source), is a cost to member states, this trade 
diversion effect has positive implications for industrial development within the 
regional grouping. The trade diversion impact of integration leads to increased 
trade between SADC countries in manufactures from the various product 
categories (i.e. Categories A, B and C) that are liberalised. This thus motivates 
developing local industries and increasing industrial capacity utilisation as 
industrial production grows so as to meet the demand for manufactures within 
the regional grouping. The income gain to the regional least-cost producer in 
the specific product obtained from sales to member states at prices in excess of 
world market prices could be used as resources for further industrial 
expansion. 
 
Apart from the cost-reduction effect discussed above, Corden’s (1972) 
economies of scale analysis brings to light another effect, which is the trade 
suppression effect. The imports from the rest of the world, which the now 
emerging least-cost regional producer used to obtain, are now replaced by its 
own domestic production. While this is similar to trade diversion since a 
cheaper non-member source is being replaced by a dearer member source, the 
dearer source is the newly-established domestic producer emerging in a 
regional member which used not even produce that product (Corden, 1972, p. 
468-9; Robson, 1987, p. 39). While this trade suppression effect is not an 
orthodox trade diversion effect, it can have implications for industrial 
development in a regional grouping. While trade suppression is a cost to 
consumers in the now emerging least-cost regional member, this may be offset 
by the industrial expansion which occurs as producers in this member state 
increase production so as to meet both the domestic and regional market.  
 
SADC countries have installed industrial capacity most of which is heavily 
underutilised due to constraints resulting from, among other things, 
insufficient demand, high costs of production, disinvestment due to unstable 
socio-political and economic situations in some countries, shortages of skilled 
labour, shortages of imported inputs due to lack of foreign currency, and old 
machinery. Therefore, trade creation and trade diversion effects could to some 
extent help improve utilisation of this industrial capacity.  
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3.2 Industrial development through dynamic effects of economic 
integration  
 
The dynamic effects arguably present the biggest potential effect of trade on 
development as they influence the growth rates of member states in the long 
run. The gains arise from the larger market which results from regional 
economic integration and these include economies of scale, greater 
competition, stimulus for investment, as well as increased factor mobility. The 
implications of dynamic effects on welfare have been discussed by many 
authors, e.g. Corden (1972), Jaber (1970), Appleyard et al. (2006), 
Schweickert (1996), Blomqvist (1993), Carim (1997), Maasdorp (1982), 
Balassa and Stoutjesdyk (1975), Holden (1996), McCarthy (1999), Carbaugh 
(2000) as well as, Greenaway and Winters (1994). Dynamic effects have 
implications for industrial development in the SADC region as discussed 
below.  
 
With the SADC FTA the regional grouping would experience dynamic effects 
of economic integration as the countries experience deeper integration by 
becoming more open and easily accessible to each other. The size of the 
market is an important determinant of market-seeking investment, and with 
the SADC FTA, the regional market is increased. This presents better 
opportunities for increased domestic and foreign investment, exploitation of 
economies of scale, and increased competitiveness, thus fostering efficient-
scale industrialisation. 
 
As SADC countries become more easily accessible, new markets would be 
easily discovered and accessed, with investment opportunities in these markets 
becoming more easily available to the rest of the region. This could motivate 
more regional cross border investment and other forms of foreign direct 
investment, thus helping in industrial development in SADC member 
countries. The ease with which member states could access new regional 
markets has implications for increased production which would result in 
industrial expansion and specialisation as countries seek to utilise the now 
easily available new markets. 
 
As trade barriers fall, a more competitive environment is created, which would 
encourage industrial expansion as monopoly power falls, managerial 
efficiency improves and efficiency in investment location increases. Increased 
competition would also bring about increased incentives for adopting new 
technologies and methods of production alongside rapid innovation, thus 
improving the operations of industries. With greater competition, firms would 
specialise on particular product categories, thus enjoying economies of scale 
that would not have been possible with smaller markets limited by trade 
restrictions. Specialisation leads to higher degrees of efficiency as factor 
productivity increases and there is use of more efficient equipment, thus 
impacting positively on industrial development in member states.  
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Also to note is that as the region continues to liberalise and industrial 
performance continues to improve, comparative advantages could change 
creating new areas of comparative advantage. Therefore, exposure to a wider 
market through increased intra-regional trade could thus help foster the 
development of infant industries into mature and competitive industries.  
 
As the SADC region continues to liberalise it is imperative to have improved 
and efficient institutions. This would lead to reduced administrative and 
transaction costs, which are gains that often lead to a reduction in production 
costs. Economic integration also gives rise to improvements in the economic 
environment, in the form of reduction in transport and input costs, as well as a 
reduction in trade risks and uncertainty. All this helps to create a favourable 
investment climate which would encourage both regional and foreign 
investment. The fear of being frozen out of the regional arrangement and thus 
face trade restrictions and high external tariffs normally extended to non-
members would also motivate foreign investors to locate in the region, thus 
helping to improve the industrial base. 
 
While the bulk of intra-SADC trade is inter-industry, intra-industry trade 
opportunities exist in the region. Economies of scale resulting from access to a 
larger regional market created by the SADC FTA would lead to specialisation, 
thus stimulating more intra-industry trade. This has implications for industrial 
expansion as some of the member states take advantage of the opportunities 
for intra-industry trade more easily and fully, as preference diversity and 
overlapping demand become more pronounced. Utilising intra-industry trade 
opportunities provides opportunities for identified industries in specific SADC 
countries to develop more, as each country lowers the number of products it 
produces, and produces each variety on a larger scale with increased 
productivity and lower costs. The overall benefits would be well structured 
and focussed industries, improvements in industrial performance, an increase 
in the emergence and growth of new business, increased innovation, and the 
ability to attract knowledge-based investment.  
 
Where economic integration leads to increased factor mobility, with factors 
freely moving from areas of surplus to areas where they are scarce, this leads 
to an increase in economic efficiency and correspondingly industrial 
expansion as countries would have access to resources. Part Five Article 22 of 
the SADC Protocol on Trade encourages increased factor mobility by 
promoting open cross-border investment regimes (SADC, 2003a). As member 
states become more accessible to each other, freer movement of ideas, 
knowledge, capital goods and technology would facilitate technological 
progress and thus help to speed up industrial expansion. However, it should be 
noted that increased capital mobility as countries seek to invest in lucrative 
markets, could have negative effects on fair competition in the host countries 
and the region as a whole. Since Part Six Article 25 of the SADC Protocol on 
Trade requires that member states “implement measures within the 
Community that prohibit unfair business practices and promote competition” 
(SADC, 2003a), it is therefore imperative for SADC member states to 
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incorporate within their industrial policy and strategies measures that are 
complementary to this Article. 
 
The SADC region has a growing number of development corridors and the 
SADC FTA would enable more and better utilisation of these corridors as 
traffic increases due to easier accessibility of countries. The SADC inter-
country transport corridors have implications for transport costs, 
communication networks and costs, business uncertainties and other risks, 
while harmonising rules and regulations for use of such infrastructure would 
reduce non-tariff barriers. This would thus have a bearing on more effective 
industrial location. 
 
SADC (2002, p. 19) and SADC (2003c, p. 36) observe that all the traditional 
SADC transport corridors are being transformed into Spatial Development 
Corridors, with Beira, Trans-Kalahari, and Maputo Development Corridors 
being at the forefront. This is expected to achieve long term development 
within SADC as the corridors are deemed to have the potential to generate 
sustainable economic growth in the presently underdeveloped areas of the 
region. For example, other development activities from other sectors along the 
corridors like agriculture, mining, tourism, commerce, etc, would be 
developed as the corridors would be instrumental in facilitating investment in 
these sectors, thereby exploiting their locational advantages in relation to the 
corridors. 
 
The region has underutilised industrial capacity and the therefore, dynamic 
effects resulting from the SADC FTA would to some extent help improve 
utilisation of this industrial capacity, as there would be a wider market, thus 
creating more effective demand. The wider market would also attract more 
market-seeking foreign investors who would find it cheaper to utilise the 
existing underutilised industrial capacity to satisfy both internal and external 
demand for their products. The easier access of inputs/resource markets and 
easier movement of productive resources between countries would also 
improve industrial capacity utilisation.  
 
3.3 Infant industry argument  
 
Corden (1974, p. 248), Mills (1965, p. 918-919) cited in Corden (1974, p. 
248), and Evans and Alizadeh (1984) observe that the infant industry 
argument is a case in which protective duties can be justified for growth and 
industrial development purposes. The classic infant industry scenario is thus 
where the protective tariff is so high that imports are effectively prohibited and 
the “infant” is allowed to operate behind a very high protective wall (Todaro, 
1997, p. 467; Appleyard and Field, 2001).  
 
The argument for protection rests on market imperfections, learning 
economies and other externalities, that an industry may possess a long-run 
comparative advantage, and that the industry in the home country had a “late 
start” and its growth is being inhibited by the low-cost imports from other 
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countries (Appleyard et al., 2006; Todaro, 1997; Corden, 1974; Lall, 2004; 
Lall, 1994). Therefore, given enough time and protection, the infant industries 
are expected to mature and outgrow the need for protection and be directly 
competitive on the world markets, as they will have achieved a reduction in 
unit costs through economies of scale as well as through learning by doing. 
Eventually, the industries would be able to produce for both domestic 
consumption and for export, as the products will now be produced more 
efficiently and at lower costs.  
 
While this argument implies inward looking industrialisation as a component 
of the industrial policy at country and regional level, there should be adequate 
grounds that the industry or industries being fostered will eventually grow and 
dispense of the protection. Therefore, the duration of protection, viability, and 
spill over effects of such industries are important considerations because 
during protection the economy incurs costs.  
 
The infant industry argument has implications for industrial development in 
SADC countries. The provisions to protect selected industries, irrespective of 
the countries in which they are located, have been included in the SADC 
Protocol on Trade through Part Four Article 21 Paragraph 1. Thise Article 
gives provision for the protection of infant industries, where upon application 
to the CMT and subject to the provisions of the World Trade Organisation, 
“member states can be allowed to suspend certain obligations of the SADC 
Protocol on Trade in respect of like goods imported from other member states” 
(SADC, 2003a).  
 
SADC countries could base the desire for infant industry protection on the 
basis of learning economies which occur in many activities within an 
economy. In this regard therefore, it is important to ensure that protection is 
given to industries where learning is relatively higher so that the economy can 
benefit from higher learning economies. This is important for SADC countries 
as they select industries for “infant protection” because, it is possible for a 
country to select and foster industries where there is little learning and do so 
by reducing output of or completely ending other industries where there are far 
greater potentials for learning. If this happens, then as Corden (1974, p. 269) 
observes, total learning for the whole economy would actually decline.  
 
Where externalities are reciprocal between industries or activities, thus, calling 
for temporary protection for all the various complementary industries or 
activities, there is a need for a well thought out investment co-ordination in 
order for the whole economy to benefit. Corden (1974, p. 258) points out that 
intervention could be through subsidising firms or activities with more 
beneficial and widespread reciprocal externalities so as to encourage them to 
produce more of these assets for mutual benefit. The results of such an 
industrial policy would be an accumulation of assets which would in the long 




However, it is important for SADC countries to note caution given by Corden 
(1974, p. 270) and Lall (2004, p. 17) on externalities that are reciprocal 
between industries or activities. They note that the industries or activities 
involved may have varying time lags in response to the protection given as 
well as differences in the duration of the learning process. In this regard 
therefore, protection may be minimised while subsidising other firms more so 
as to stimulate them more, thus raising the costs accruing to the economy as a 
result of infant industry protection. Therefore, while infant industry protection 
has an important role to play in the creation of an industrial base, it is a tool of 
economic policy that must be employed selectively and wisely. Each SADC 
country should thus employ it with reference to both the short run and long run 
effects on its economy as a whole.  
 
It is important therefore, that the provisions in Part Four Article 21 Paragraph 
1 of the SADC Protocol on Trade be utilised only in those cases where there 
are adequate grounds that the industry being fostered will eventually grow and 
dispense of the protection. This is important because during protection, the 
economy incurs costs resulting from the protection, thus, the industry has to 
eventually mature so that as Bastable (1921) notes, the ultimate saving in costs 
would be able to compensate the community for the high costs of protection 
(Corden, 1974, p. 265). Failure by the firms to mature and operate successfully 
without protection means that protection has to be permanent, thus, defeating 
part of the justification for infant industry protection. The danger in this was 
recognised by the regional grouping, and as such, in order to prevent countries 
from abusing this provision, and protect any industry that claims to be an 
infant industry without any through assessment, Paragraph 2 of Article 21 
gives the CMT the power to impose terms and conditions to which 
authorisation to protect infant industries shall be subject. Therefore, as per 
Paragraph 3 of Article 21, the CMT regularly reviews the protection of the 
infant industries by member states (SADC, 2003a). 
 
SADC countries are at different levels of industrial development, and with the 
SADC FTA in place, imperfect competition and allocative inefficiencies could 
arise due to stiff competition on local industries from stronger regional 
countries. The asymmetric tariff reduction schedule which governs the 
implementation of the SADC Protocol on Trade takes these differences into 
account, and thus, the need for tariff reduction obligations to be commensurate 
with the level of development of each country. Thus, in accordance with Part 
Two Article 3 of the SADC Protocol on Trade, tariff reduction is not across 
the board but is in phases with each product category having a different tariff 
reduction deadline (see Table A-1, Appendix 1).  
 
Thus, Article 3 gives support to Article 21 in helping SADC countries to 
develop their industrial base through infant industry protection. For example, 
countries have the right to determine the products they put in category C, and 
liberalisation of products in this category can continue beyond the eight years 
from entry into force of the SADC Protocol on Trade. Thus, crucial domestic 
industries that fall in product category C and have demonstrable potential to 
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grow could thus be selected and nurtured as “infants” until they mature and 
are due for liberalisation as per the asymmetric tariff reduction schedule. Thus, 
in line with the provisions in Part Two Article 4 Paragraph 2 of the SADC 
Protocol on Trade, during this period and with respect to these selected “infant 
industries” countries should adopt appropriate industrial strategies that would 
improve their competitiveness as well as that of other yet to be liberalised 
product categories that may not necessarily be classified as infant industries.  
 
Notwithstanding the importance of the elimination of barriers to intra-SADC 
trade, Article 3 Paragraph 1(c) gives provisions for those member states which 
may have been adversely affected by the removal of tariffs and non-tariff 
barriers (NTBs) to trade to apply to the CMT for an extension in effecting the 
elimination of trade barriers. Thus, industries in the concerned product 
category(ies) would enjoy temporary or an extended protection period during 
the grace period. This provision could be well utilised by member states when 
it comes to the identified “infant industries” being adversely affected by the 
removal of tariffs and NTBs. The grace period extended should thus be 
utilised fully to develop further and consolidate the industries concerned and 
thus prepare them for competition once the grace period is over. 
 
 
4. Possible Limitations for Industrial Development within the SADC 
Region  
 
There are limitations in the theoretical debates and assumptions upon which 
expected industrial development within SADC is based. These place 
limitations on the extent to which the regional grouping would be able to 
utilise asymmetric tariff reduction to foster industrial development.  
 
4.1 Limitations with the infant industry argument 
 
While this argument is theoretically valid, identifying the industries that are 
likely to be low-cost producers and thus could be given temporary protection 
is not going to be easy. A country may select an industry which would not 
grow and therefore, by the time the industry is to be liberalised fully as per the 
tariff reduction schedule, the expected level of industrial development would 
not have been achieved. Therefore, it is important for each SADC country to 
note that not every industry that claims to be an infant should automatically be 
granted protection.  
 
4.2 The assumption of existing capacity to expand industries  
 
To develop industrial capacity within the region there should be adequate 
human and nonhuman capacity and capabilities to do so. This assumption 
cannot be made about SADC and as such, industrial development may not 
necessarily occur as expected despite the provisions for industrial 
development in the SADC Protocol on Trade. . 
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SADC (2000, p. 38) and SADC Industry and Trade (1999, p. 6; 2001, p. 7) 
have argued that the SADC region experiences shortages of labour, especially 
skilled labour. Such shortages have been attributed to HIV/AIDS, the brain 
drain to developed countries and lack of adequate training in the necessary 
technological capabilities relevant in manufacturing. Unfavourable 
immigration laws in the region present problems in getting work permits and 
licenses, and this prevents attracting excess skilled labour from other SADC 
countries as well as from outside the region, thus, limiting improving local 
technological capabilities needed to improve domestic industrial capacity.  
 
In terms of nonhuman capital, of concern are shortages of essential imported 
inputs, especially modern equipment and machinery, high production costs 
due to expensive working and investment capital, as well as price hikes in the 
price of petroleum products the world over. To note also are the cash flow 
difficulties coupled with high interest rates and inflation. Other concerns are 
the relatively high utility tariffs due to the lack of low cost economic 
infrastructure like transport, communication and other utilities; erratic 
provision of water and electric power in some counties; and dumping, 
especially in those countries with limited technical capacity to handle this 
problem.  
 
4.3 Responsiveness of economic systems to changing price incentives 
 
Of concern should be the responsiveness of the economic systems in the 
SADC member states to the changing price incentives that take place with free 
trade in the various product categories. If the economic systems are not 
responsive (which economic theory argues to be mostly the case in the 
developing countries, especially in the short-run), factors of production will 
not easily move from the high-cost sectors which are suppose to be contracting 
to the low-cost sectors which are suppose to be expanding. This results in a 
process which is characteristic of the specific-factors model2, and as such, in 
the short-run, the gains from specialisation which SADC countries would 
expect (in terms of increased production and thus industrial expansion in the 
low-cost sector) are reduced.  
 
Where production structures in SADC countries will have responded to the 
changing price incentives taking place in the regional grouping, it is expected 
that specialisation following comparative advantage would occur. There will 
be an expansion of the sector(s) using relatively more intensively the relatively 
more abundant factor. In most of the SADC countries, this is the labour-
intensive sector, and thus the incentive to expand labour-intensive production, 
instead of the more modern, capital-intensive manufacturing sector. However, 
for South Africa, this would mean the expansion of technology and skill-
intensive manufactures and capital goods, as it is the capital abundant country 
in the regional grouping and has competitive advantage in most manufactured 
                                                 
2This model explores the implication of short-run factor immobility between sectors in a 
Heckscher-Ohlin theorem (Appleyard et al., 2006). 
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products in the region. Thus, South African would have the opportunity to 
develop and strengthen further its industrial base, thus widening further the 
already existing gap between itself and the rest of the member states.  
 
Therefore, industrialisation through specialisation following comparative 
advantages would raise contention among member states as some would not 
be willing to rely on growth in the production of the traditional goods 
(agriculture and primary goods, and the labour-intensive manufactures), when 
this is at the expense of modern manufacturing which has the potential to 
develop and strengthen their industrial base. 
 
4.4 The static analysis and the distribution of benefits between member 
countries 
 
In the static analysis of trade creation and trade diversion effects, it is often 
argued that the benefits largely accrue to the country gaining exports, which 
thus benefits from industrial expansion through new and increased investment 
and job creation, while adversely affecting those which do not earn exports. 
This raises the problem of polarisation of industries of manufacturing in the 
more industrially advanced country. The larger and more industrially 
advanced country in the SADC region is South Africa, and it is more likely to 
expand its production and industrial base on the basis of trade creation and 
trade diversion effects, increasing returns to scale, and external economies, 
especially those based on technological competition.  
 
While as a rule free trade agreements do not provide for an easing of factor 
flows as the focus is on the flow of goods and non-factor services, for SADC, 
there is Part Five Article 22 of the SADC Protocol on Trade which gives 
special conditions and encouragement for factor flows between member states 
so as to encourage regional cross border investment. With the liberalisation of 
product categories at various stages as per the tariff reduction schedules, 
changes in industrial location could be experienced.  
 
It has been argued that industries will tend to move to locate in the centre 
(which in the case of SADC is South Africa), as they seek to take advantage of 
a more developed industrial base and as such experiencing lower rentals. 
Downstream industries will move to the centre where there is a high 
concentration of upstream industries which provide them with inputs more 
cheaply. Upstream firms will also move to the centre where there is a high 
concentration of downstream firms which will serve as markets for their end 
products. Industry will also concentrate in South Africa as it has a larger 
market due to its very large population and higher income levels. Therefore, in 
this regard, South Africa will be able to develop further its industrial structure 
while most of the rest of SADC losses its industries and ability to develop 
industrial structures further.  
 
However, it is important to note that as the SADC region continues to 
liberalise and both tariff and non-tariff barriers continue to fall, trade costs in 
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the region would fall to significantly low levels such that firms would 
motivated to locate in the less developed countries within SADC so as to take 
advantage of locational advantages in these countries which are not in South 
Africa. For example, some of the less developed countries within SADC have 
lower wages and these would be strong enough to attract industry. 
Improvements in the transport and communication system of SADC through 
functional cooperation through the SADC Protocol on Transport, 
Communication and Meteorology would motivate firms to relocate to the 
periphery, and access the market in South Africa and other SADC countries 
through the improved transport system. Also to note is the commitment by the 
South African government to contribute to the development of the region, and 
this has seen an active encouragement of capital exports to other SADC 
countries. There has also been demonstrable willingness by South African 




This paper has explored the possibilities of utilising the provisions in Part Two 
Articles 3 and 4, Part Four Article 21, Part Five Article 22 and Part Six Article 
25 in the SADC Protocol on Trade together with theoretical debates based on 
the infant industry protection, and the static and dynamic effects of economic 
integration to illustrate possible ways in which the industrial base within the 
SADC region could be developed. It has also looked at how the asymmetric 
tariff reduction schedule could work to the advantage of countries by taking 
advantage of the durations in which they need not liberalise product categories 
and use such periods to consolidate and develop further industries in 
preparation for competition.  
 
The infant industry protection argument, as well as the static and dynamic 
effects of economic integration have limitations as bases upon which trade can 
foster industrial development. Limitations for industrial development are also 
presented by the fact that SADC countries have constraints in human and non-
human capacity and capabilities needed to foster industrial development. 
Therefore, utilising the provisions within the SADC Protocol on Trade geared 
towards industrial development may not necessarily result in developing 
industrial capacities within member states in the magnitudes or levels that 
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ADDITIONAL INFORMATION FOR SECTION 2 
 
 











Capital goods, raw materials 
This is the immediate 
liberalisation list, under which 
tariffs have to be reduced to 
zero immediately upon entry 





Majority of other goods apart 
from the sensitive products, 
e.g. the intermediate goods 
This is the gradual liberalisation 
list, and the goods will have 
their tariffs reduced gradually, 
starting immediately upon entry 






Nationally sensitive goods to 
be defined by each country, 
e.g. finished products 
This is the sensitive products 
list, deemed to be sensitive to 
immediate tariff liberalisation 
for a variety of reasons. 
Liberalisation may start within 
the agreed phase out period, i.e. 
five years after entry into force 
of the Trade Protocol, but can 
continue beyond the eight years. 
E 
Products necessary for 
the protection of security 
and to maintain peace 
Firearms, ammunitions, 
swords, bayonets and similar 
arms and parts thereof. 
Can be exempted from 
preferential treatment under 
Part Two Articles 9 and 10 of 
the SADC Protocol on Trade. 
These comprise a very small 
fraction of intra-SADC trade. 
 
Source: Adapted from Mutambara (2001, p. 21); SADC (2003a); Zimbabwe 


















ADDITIONAL INFORMATION FOR SECTION 2 
 
Table A-2. Implementation of the SADC Protocol on Trade through 
aymmetric tariff reduction 
 
 
Asymmetric phase down for the 



















goods in this 
category. 
Front load tariff 
phase down. i.e. 
phase down tariffs 












Immediate liberalisation of goods in 
Category A. Phase down tariffs 
earlier and faster for Categories B & 
C. 99 percent of tariff lines consisting 
of 97 percent of imports from SADC 
will qualify for duty free access into 
















goods in this 
category. 
Mid-load tariff 
phase down, i.e. 
start tariff phase 
down in the 





for SADC; 90 
percent coverage 
for South Africa. 
 











goods in this 
category.  
Back-load tariff 
phase down. i.e. 
start their tariff 
phase down in the 
5th or 6th year of 
implementation.   
 

























Source. Own Table derived from Hess (2004, pp. 7, 8); Table 1 above; SADC 
(2002, p. 22); Cassim, Onyango and van Seventer (2004, p. 11); Nhara 
(2003, p. 22). 
 
Notes:  (i) The D. R. C. although currently excluded, have initiated processes to join the FTA 
(Hess, 2004, p. 7).  
 (ii) Angola acceded to the Protocol in March 2003 and is in the process of preparing 
its tariff reduction offers that would be taken to other SADC members for their 
consideration. It is expected that its tariff phase down may be ready for 
implementation by early 2004 (Mmegi/The Reporter, 2004; SADC, 2003b, p. 23). 
(iii) SACU1 = This is the Southern African Customs Union whose members are South 
Africa, Botswana, Lesotho Namibia and Swaziland. 
 
